Regulators must attempt to avoid any highly visible mistakes if they are to maintain their positions of power. If they allow an innovative product into the market and it is later discovered to be dangerous or inferior, they may lose their positions. On the other hand, if a new and truly beneficial product is withheld from the market and consumers are therefore denied its benefits, then this error is unlikely to come into public view. Consequently, regulators are naturally reluctant to permit innovative products to enter the marketplace. The benefits foregone by consumers as a result of such policies rarely come to light, except occasionally when the excluded new beneficial products are accepted abroad—e. g., the Sensor Pad for the detection of breast cancers (more information).

On the other hand, if a product is already on the market, then its benefits are already in public view. If potentially dangerous side effects are then discovered, they may be dismissed as merely theoretical or may be disconnected with the product in the minds of the public. Therefore, even as beneficial new products are excluded from the market, hazardous older products are not necessarily withdrawn. The popular acceptance of such hazardous products is particularly ominous in light of the tendency of individuals to abandon careful personal judgment under government regulation (for examples, see p. 4.10:5).