Businesses that have received subsidies or other regulatory privileges tend, as a direct consequence of those subsidies and privileges, to have more resources available (at least, in the early stages). Armed with these additional resources, they are better able to lobby for continuation and enhancement of those privileges, particularly in comparison with any factions who might oppose them, such as their now-weakened competitors. For the same reason, organized labor in the privileged industries possesses greater resources to lobby toward those same ends.

At the same time, since regulation is no longer subject to direct legislative control (p. 5.4:52), regulators receive little or no political feedback from the consumers who are harmed by the restriction of competition. The regulatory process therefore tends to create a pressure for further regulation, specifically directed toward the goal of limiting competition. Furthermore, each regulation creates or augments a bureaucracy with a vested interest in increasing its own power through the further expansion of regulation. Lobbying by those bureaucrats therefore creates an additional impetus toward further regulatory laws.