Although all of these weaknesses render voting a relatively inefficient method of conveying information feedback to decision-makers, it should not be concluded that voting provides no feedback at all. Clearly, for example, the leaders of a democratic government can be voted out if dissatisfaction is sufficiently widespread—and if voters are willing to overlook the faults of the opposing candidates. Democratic elections are capable of conveying feedback on a gross level, even though they cannot provide fine-tuned responses comparable to the pricing system of the marketplace. Indeed, the voting mechanism may sometimes even be chosen as the most efficient decision-making method by institutions within the free market. The determination of the officers of a club or corporation, for instance, does not easily lend itself to market interaction as we have described it, with buyers, sellers, and pricing. Such officers are usually elected by club members or stockholders, since this procedure, despite its notorious faults, may be the best available. Because such organizations are voluntary, of course, the shortcomings of these voting processes are much less insidious than in a powerful democratic government. One can resign from a club or sell one's stock, but one cannot usually emigrate to another country without major costs to one's life.